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The Two Galilees

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PREFACE

I wrote this paper in March 1982. In April 1982, I visited Palestine for two weeks where brutal suppression on the West Bank and Gaza and massive war preparation to invade Lebanon were being done in concert. Since that time, Israel's fascist ruling troika of Begin, Sharon and Eitan unleashed savage and barbaric bombardment of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples in Lebanon.

The explicit goal of attacking Beirut is to eliminate physically PLO leadership, PLO's fighting ability and Palestinian institutions. It has been remarked correctly that the so-called "Peace for Galilee" operation was directed towards the West Bank and Gaza. In an interview with Menachem Milson, the head of the "Civilian" Administration in the West Bank and Gaza (*Ma'ariv*, 9 July 1982), he indicated that "the destruction of the military ability of the PLO opens new opportunities to talk with the Palestinians. But their relationship with the Camp David process will depend on the fate of the PLO in Beirut." The clear implication from him and from other articulators of Zionist strategy is that with the total elimination of the PLO, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza will accept taking part in the "autonomy" talks, as interpreted by Israel. In other words, in the Zionist view, the PLO is the only obstacle on the road to imposing Israeli sovereignty on the West Bank and Gaza.

In a recent interview with Geula Cohen, the Knesset member from the ultra-rightist party (*Ha-Tehiya*), on the occasion of the party's decision to join the Likud government (*Yediot Aharonot*, 30 July 1982), she was extremely explicit regarding the imposition of Israeli sovereignty over the areas occupied in 1967. Formed in opposition to the Camp David Agreements, her party finds it expedient now, after the invasion of Lebanon, to join the Begin's government because "according to its

basic policy line the government will start applying Israeli sovereignty there [West Bank]."

So it has become abundantly clear, especially in the light of the invasion of Lebanon and its true objectives, that the fate of the West Bank and Gaza is following that of Galilee. Any illusions that might have prevailed before concerning Zionist plans towards the West Bank and Gaza must have been shattered by the current Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Khalil Nakhleh
13 August 1982

The Two Galilees

by

Khalil Nakhleh

I. Introduction

In a recent study on "Israeli settlements in occupied Arab lands," prepared for the United Nations' Seminar on the Question of Palestine (Havana, 31 August-4 September 1981), the sociologist Janet Abu-Lughod wrote: "the parallels between Galilee and the West Bank are of more than passing significance" (page 33).[1] The purpose of this paper is to show that, in spite of the obvious differences in the timing and method of military occupation, the West Bank, in Zionist practice, is treated as another Galilee. The paper will show, further, that the parallels in the Zionist occupation of the two regions of Palestine are not accidental; but instead emanate from well-defined Zionist goals to achieve hegemony over all of Palestine.

The parallels between Galilee and the West Bank (and Gaza) are not unexpected, since the military occupation of the West Bank commenced 19 years after the occupation of Galilee, which was characterized by fairly successful experimentation in military government and control. It is no wonder then that that reservoir of successful military occupation was put to use in a newly-occupied area, whose main ingredient—Palestinian population density in relation to the Jewish state—is similar to that of Galilee. But the parallels go beyond mere successful tactics in control; they expose a Zionist view towards the recently occupied parts of Palestine that duplicates their view towards those parts occupied in 1948, in so far as the relationship to the Jewish state is concerned.[2]

Of course, there is no attempt here to claim that similarities exist on all levels between the Galilee

and the West Bank. The physical area of the West Bank, for example, is about one and a half times that of the Galilee (5.5 million dunums vs. 3.5 million dunums). Moreover, the West Bank's Palestinian population is more than double that of the Galilee (704,000 vs. 296,100) (*Statistical Abstract of Israel* 1981: 32-33 and 714). (These figures do not include East Jerusalem, which adds another 120,000 to the population of the West Bank.)

However, two similar important implications have to be highlighted for the purposes of this discussion: first, the two regions contain the densest concentration of Palestinian population in Palestine, and second, the two regions constitute the two main limbs of the Arab state of Palestine as it was proposed in the 1947 Partition Plan. As we shall see below, these similarities stand very clearly in Zionist planning, and explain to a large degree the parallels in Zionist practice in the two regions.

II. Control and Zionist Hegemony

The Zionist occupation of Galilee was completed by 31 October 1948, or about five and a half months after the formal establishment of Israel. But the plan to incorporate Galilee into the Jewish state by all means possible was put into effect soon after the 1947 Partition Plan, through the effective use of coordinated and sustained terrorism. (Nazzal 1978).

Yigal Allon, commander of the Haganah forces (the regular Zionist army) in the Galilee, revealed in his memoirs how his command used psychological terrorism:

> We saw a need to clean the Inner Galilee and to create a Jewish territorial succession in the entire area of the Upper Galilee. . . . We therefore looked for means which did not force us into employing force, in order to cause the tens of thousands of sulky Arabs who remained in Galilee to flee . . .
>
> I gathered all the Jewish mukhtars, who have contact with Arabs in different villages and asked them to whisper in the ears of some Arabs that a great Jewish reinforcement had arrived in Galilee and that it is going to burn all the villages of Huleh. They should suggest to these Arabs, as their friends, to escape while there is still time. . . The tactic reached its goal completely. The building of the police station at Halsa fell into our hands without a shot. The wide area was cleaned.
>
> (*Ha Sepher Ha Palmach*, vol. 2, p. 286) (quoted in Hirst 1977: 41)

This psychological warfare was effective because it built on real incidents of terror that had occurred, like the April 1948 massacre of 254 Arab villagers at Deir Yassin by the forces of Menachem Begin's Irgun. With the Galilee part of the new Jewish state accomplished, and with the West Bank incorporated into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the possibility of a Palestinian Arab state was aborted.

However, the Zionist strategy of gaining a Galilee devoid of Arabs failed, as it did for the entire country. Of the total population of the Northern District in 1948, about 63 percent were Arabs. They were distributed in 70 villages and towns. For Israeli strategists, therefore, the new situation had serious implications on two counts: control and "Judaization" (a term used by Zionist planners) of the region. It is interesting to note that this situation confronted Zionist occupiers for the second time in 1967, upon the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and that both situations are described in the Zionist lexicon as the "demographic problem" or the "demographic nightmare."

I shall examine below how such a "demographic problem" was "controlled," and what Zionist plans emerged to eradicate it altogether, in both Galilees.

Controlling Galilee in 1948 where about 58 percent of the Palestinians who remained behind Israeli lines lived, was done directly through a comprehensive military government. The first two years (1948–1950) Galilee was under an outright military occupation. The military government was officially established in January 1950, based on the British Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 (Jiryes 1976: 16). The Regulations gave the military governor the absolute discretion in appointing

military commanders, and entrusted complete judicial power to military courts.

The military government controlled Galilee for 18 long years, until the end of 1966. During that period, the military government relied heavily on selected articles of the Emergency Regulations.

Article 125 was the most notorious. Based on this article, the military governor was able to declare any area a "closed area"; thus entering or leaving required a written permit. Consequently

> all the Arab villages and settlements in Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev were divided into small pockets called "closed areas," usually consisting of one or more Arab villages, which no Arab could leave or enter for any reason without first obtaining a written permit from the military governor of the area.
>
> (Jiryes 1976: 17–18)

This article was obviously used to fragment, encapsulate and circumscribe any cluster of Arab population in the Jewish state. Since the new military government could not prevent the physical and geographical proximity of the Arab population, it aimed instead at restraining its mobility and its access to job places, which were increasingly outside its area of residence. Permits, or access to them, became the symbols of reward and punishment during the first 18 years of military rule.

The other articles of the Emergency Regulations that were used at will by the military governor were Article 109 which allowed the banishment of individuals (usually from one area to another inside the state); Article 110 which allowed the military governor to place individuals under house and/or town arrest; Article 111 which allowed placing individuals in administrative detention; and Article 137 which required licenses for all firearms.

The military government was so pervasive during those early years of occupation that it affected every aspect of Palestinian life under occupation. Arab villages became the uncontested field where the military governor, or the gun-toting "quislings" who worked with him, could spread ruthless terror. In the words of one military governor (as quoted in Jiryes 1976: 40):

> [The military government] interferes in the life of the Arab citizen from the day of his birth to the day of his death. It has the final say in all matters concerning workers, peasants, professional men, merchants, and educated men, with schooling and social services. It interferes in the registration of births, deaths, and even marriages, in questions of land and in the appointment and dismissal of teachers and civil servants. Often, too, it arbitrarily interferes in the affairs of political parties, in political and social activities, and in local municipal councils.

The manipulation of the daily aspects of Palestinian village life in Galilee and other dense population concentrations was accompanied by a process of land dispossession; by preventing the Arab villager from having access to his land. The bulk of Arab land was expropriated during this period, greatly facilitated by the military government system. This led Ben Gurion to declare that "the military government came into existence to protect the right of Jewish settlement in all parts of the state" (Jiryes 1976: 53).

With the formal dissolution of the military government by the end of 1966, a few noticeable changes took place, such as freedom of movement and the removal of the required written permits to move in and out of Galilee. However, in the place of the military government, a "special duties department" of the police was formed to deal with the Arab population. In many ways, the situation since the beginning of 1967 has been more pernicious. The Emergency Regulations remained in effect, and they continue to be used as the basis for administrative detentions, restricting the freedom of assembly, and house and/or town arrests of individuals. Now, politically "undesirable" individuals and groups are punished under these Regulations (Jiryes 1976: 64–5). Two recent examples stand out: (1) In his role as Acting Defense Minister, Begin banned a scheduled meeting for the Arab population in Israel from being held in Nazareth to protest Israel's policy towards the Palestinians (*New York Times*, 2 December 1980); (2) About four months later (12 April 1981), the

Minister of Defense, relying on the same Regulations, declared the fledgling Arab Committee for National Coordination illegal. (The order was published in the *Official Gazette* on 16 April 1981).

Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza came about six months after the military government over Galilee had formally ended. Thus, after establishing its rule in Galilee for 18 years, the military government apparatus started anew in the West Bank, on the heels of a swift and demoralizing military defeat similar to that experienced in Galilee, albeit of a different intensity, duration, and timing. The military's first act was to establish the preeminence of military rule over the newly-acquired Palestinian land which this time was even less devoid of its Palestinian people. Section 2 of the Proclamation 2 of Israel's Military Command in the West Bank states:

> all laws which were in force in the area on June 7, 1967, shall continue to be in force as far as they do not contradict this or any other proclamation or order made by me (the West Bank Area Commander) or conflict with the changes arising by virtue of the occupation of the Israel Defense Forces of the area.
>
> (Shehadeh and Kuttab 1980: 18)

Having failed for the second time since 1947 to achieve the Zionist dream of acquiring Palestine without the Palestinians, and having found themselves after their stunning military victory occupying all of Palestine, but with an additional million Palestinian Arabs, the military government issued a series of proclamations targeted at the acquisition of the land and the control of the people. Although they did not rely directly on the 1945 Emergency Regulations, (which are also used in the West Bank and Gaza), the military proclamations suspended every basic freedom for the newly occupied population in a striking similarity to what was done in Galilee about two decades earlier. Freedoms of movement, assembly, speech and expression, and academic freedom were all affected. By Military Order No. 3, for example, the Military Commander assumed the power to declare certain areas "closed," whereby movement from and into such areas would require a permit.

Thus, the whole West Bank is declared a "closed area," and permits to enter it or leave it can be given "at the sole discretion of the military governor" (Shehadeh and Kuttab 1980: 71).

Other restrictions on the movement, imposed by a variety of military orders, are: the application of extended curfews, the erection of road blocks, the imposition of house and/or town arrests on individuals, and the prevention of West Bankers from sleeping in 1948 areas and vice-versa. These restrictions were imposed and enforced, in tandem with a free and highly sanctioned movement for Zionist settlers, in an onslaught to Judaize the West Bank, parallel to that experienced in Galilee since 1948, but with an unmatched zeal and colonial fervor.

As in the Galilee, the military governor assumed full powers that pervaded every aspect of people's lives. Proclamation No. 2, Section 3 states:

> Every governmental, legislative, appointive and administrative power in respect of the region or its inhabitants shall henceforth be vested in me [the West Bank Commander] alone, and shall only be exercised by me or by persons appointed by me for that purpose or acting on my behalf.
>
> (Shehadeh and Kuttab 1980: 101)

Such a proclamation, in effect, vested the military governor with full legislative power.

The control of the two most densely-populated regions of Palestine—Galilee and the West Bank—was achieved in the first instance by the manipulation of existing legal and economic measures, or by legislating new measures for that purpose—in sum, by direct military force. In both regions, however, the military government depended on "quislings" for its eventual hegemony over the region. Kinship ties and the clan structure are used extensively to create agents for the regime in the heart of the occupied population.

It is instructive at this stage to describe in detail the "non-military" process of control that Zionist planners have been using in the two regions under discussion. Although the goal is the same, the means of achieving the desired control differed in this case. In the West Bank, the primary mechan-

ism used is the "Village Leagues." Created in 1979, these are organizations based on kinship loyalty, headed by well-known collaborators with the occupying regime who, according to one journalist's report, "are not known as the most honest people," but they are propped up by the Uzi machine-guns of the Israeli army. The "membership" often are reputed petty criminals and thugs. The Village Leagues have their own "security forces" who are salaried (5000/month Israeli Shekels) and who receive military training in Israeli Border Guard training centers (see *Ha'aretz*, 8 and 19 March 1982).

The Village Leagues were created in the wake of the Camp David-generated peace accords between Egypt and Israel, in an obvious and immediate goal of circumventing the popularly-elected nationalist leadership of the various municipalities. In addition to undermining existing nationalist institutions, the ultimate goal behind creating these associations was to fabricate an alternative local leadership that would challenge the PLO's legitimacy, and would purport to speak in the name of the Palestinians within the Camp David framework. Thus, in the many well-coached interviews on the Arabic program on Israeli television, Mustafa Dudeen, the head of the Village League in al-Khalil (Hebron) region, claimed to speak simultaneously for the interest of the Palestinians and against the PLO and their "agents."

As if to emphasize their unpopular and unrepresentative character, the occupation authority has been trying to impose the legitimacy of the Village Leagues through intimidation, terror, economic rewards and accessibility to the military government. A Jewish Israeli journalist reported recently that the armed men of the Leagues "are used with the knowledge of the authorities for regular policing tasks and for political harassment" (*Ha'aretz*, 19 March 1982). They patrol streets at night; they attack cars and homes of outspoken nationalist Palestinians; and they attack nationalist institutions (as they did recently with Bethlehem University). As for the leadership of these Leagues, the military-civilian administration, in a series of coordinated moves, is trying to channel, in a public and open manner, all economic benefits through them. Development funds, while blocked from other sources, are funneled conspicuously to the villages that have accepted to join. The head of the civilian administration, according to one report, "distributed checks to the Leagues in open ceremonies" (*Al-Hamishmar*, 12 February 1982). Moreover, the heads of the Leagues are allowed to mediate in hiring and firing of teachers, in obtaining family reunification permits, etc.

Establishing the Village Leagues has not been an easy task for Zionist planners. Since 1979 they have succeeded in establishing Village Leagues in four regions: al-Khalil (Hebron), Ramallah, Bethlehem and Nablus; where they have been unsuccessful, they used intimidation and outright terror. Amnon Kapeliuk (*Al-Hamishmar*, 11 January 1982) described what happened in one such case in the region of Tulkarm and Jenin. In the village of Jab'a, where the village elders refused to cooperate with the military authorities in the creation of a new Village League, "the army surrounded the village and gathered all the men in the central square forcing them to lie on the ground all night. Several young men were heavily beaten and humiliated by the soldiers."

Mechanisms of control used in Galilee were different—there was no attempt to create something like the Village Leagues. Neither was at the time a PLO leadership that Zionist planners were trying to discredit or replace. Except for two Arab localities (Nazareth and Shafa-Amr), there existed no local councils. However, to block the rise of nationalist leaders and identity, the military government and the dominant political party coaxed, or pressured the heads of clans to collaborate with them. They relied on familial and "confessional" ties in forming Arab local councils and slates affiliated with the dominant Zionist party for Knesset elections. It is clear that the tactics used in creating a grouping of kin-based "quislings" for the ultimate goal of preventing Palestinian self-determination bear a strong resemblance in both regions. (See Lustick 1980, for a more detailed discussion of the system of control.)

Since the purpose of occupying the two regions under discussion was to complete the Zionist process of establishing a Jewish Zionist state in all of

Palestine, and since both regions constituted good agricultural land that is densely-settled by Palestinians, the twin targets of land and people—Judaization and depopulation—characterized the practice of Israeli military occupation in both situations.

III. Judaization

Transforming Palestine into a Jewish entity was a goal long held by the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency much earlier than the establishment of the state in 1948. Even with the existence of a substantial Arab minority within the borders of Israel, that goal persisted through the sustained expropriation of Arab lands and the simultaneous effacement and destruction of Arab villages and towns. This Zionist view was candidly reaffirmed in 1976 by then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In a meeting between the Committee of the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in Israel and the Prime Minister on 24 May 1976, Rabin reaffirmed that "Israel is a Jewish state whose goal is the realization of Zionist aspirations . . ." (Nakhleh and Zureik 1980: 214–5). As the chief spokesman of the government, Rabin reiterated the well-entrenched Zionist position that the Arab Palestinian population *cannot* constitute a "national minority" in Israel; it can only constitute disparate and fragmented religious or sectarian communities. Like their brothers and sisters in the West Bank and Gaza, therefore, they can be defined only as *Arvei Eretz Yisrael* (the Arabs of the Land of Israel). While their Jewishness is not sought after, their Palestinianness is denied.

Zionist designs to control and Judaize Galilee were hinted at as early as 1937 during Ben Gurion's testimony to the Peel Commission. Since Galilee was Arab, both in terms of the 1947 Partition Plan, and in demographic terms, depopulating and Judaizing it were top priority. The first substantive attempt to achieve that goal was done during the Zionist military campaign in the second half of 1948, which resulted in the occupation of the entire Northern District, and in the abrupt reduction of the indigenous Palestinian Arab population by about 56 percent. Simultaneously, of course, there was a 35 percent increase in the Jewish population of the district, as it is clear from the table below.

Table I
Arab and Jewish Population in the Northern District, by selected time periods.

Year	Arabs	Jews
12/31/1946*	207,490	39,410
11/ 8/1948**	90,600	53,400
Difference (%)	-56.3%	+35.5%

* U.N., General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee, Second Session, November 1, 1947, *Report of Sub-Committee* 2 A/Ac. 14/32, p. 43.

** *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1981*: 32, Table II/3.

Galilee persisted as the number one target for Judaization because, until 1967, it was the only region that defied demographically the Jewish character of Israel. (The West Bank and Gaza replaced it in eminence on this score.) Zionist officials made their designs repeatedly explicit. Joseph Nahmani who headed *Keren Kayemet Li-Yisrael* (Jewish National Fund) from 1935–1965, and who is credited as the architect of the "Project for the Judaization of the Galilee," stated in a memorandum he sent in 1953 to the then Minister of Defense, Ben Gurion, the following:

> Though Western Galilee has now been occupied, it still has not been freed of its Arab population, as happened in other parts of the country. There are still fifty-one villages and the city of Nazareth whose inhabitants have not left. . . The very existence of a unified Arab group in this part of the country is an invitation to the Arab States to press their claims to the area. . .
>
> (as quoted in Jiryes 1976: 105–6)

The Zionist view of the necessary transformation of Galilee transcends mere demographic distribution. The basis of the Zionist character-

ization of the "problem," for Galilee and the West Bank alike, is anchored in an inherently racist view of the indigenous Arab population of the area. In 1977, in brutal and arrogant candor, then Minister of Agriculture Sharon warned about the Arab "gentile" population, and called for "saving the Galilee" (*Al-Ittihad*, 12 September 1977). Two years following Sharon's warning, a high ranking IDF officer expressed the view that the Arabs in Galilee are a "cancer" in the body of the state (*Ha'aretz*, 30 December–7 December 1979).

At present, Sharon has shifted his focus to the West Bank where he presents the following vision of the future:

> I believe that 30 years from now, there should be about 1 million Jews living in a ten-mile to 15-mile radius around Jerusalem. I believe that in the rest of Judea and Samaria there will be about 300,000 Jews.
>
> (*Time* magazine, 5 October 1981)

Pervasive racism is not limited to top government officials, nor to attitudes towards the Arabs in Galilee; it permeates the various levels of the settlement (*hitnahlout*) project, official and unofficial. The following encounter is an illustration of this view:

> In another instance, a peasant asked an official [of the Israel Lands Administration], "What are you offering me? Is my land worth only two hundred pounds per dunnum?" The official replied, "This is not your land, it is ours, and we are paying you 'watchman's' wages, for that is all you are. You have 'watched' our land for two thousand years and now we are paying your fee. But the land has always been ours!
>
> (Hanna Naqqara, *Al-Ittihad*, 15 July 1966, as quoted in Jiryes 1976: 73–74).

The settlers themselves share in this view of total Judaization of Palestine, regardless of the region, but with a focused thrust into the two regions under discussion. The words of one settler from Ofra, near Ramallah, are expressive:

> I believe that in the final analysis the land of Israel will be predominantly Jewish, and it is in accordance with this belief that I relate to the Arab minority therein. . . . If I could, I would annex all the territory in our hands to the State of Israel today and let the Arabs choose whichever Arab citizenship they prefer. . . . there's nothing wrong with making life difficult for them in the hope that they will emigrate.
>
> (Halabi 1981: 208)

Although it is easy for some to dismiss the views of the settlers on the West Bank on the ground that they are religious fanatics or national chauvinists, it is clear from this comparison, however, that not only the official practices are comparable between the two areas, but also are the views of the more "enlightened" settlers in Galilee to the "pioneers" in the West Bank. In a series of four articles on "Galilee of Arabs and Jews" in 1979 (*Ha'aretz*, 30 November–7 December 1979), Amos Elon focused his journalistic prism on the settlement of Carmiel. As one of the most successful and attractive "development towns" in Galilee, Carmiel was created on expropriated Arab land in 1964. "The relations between Jews and Arabs in Galilee," he writes, "have never been as tense since the establishment of the state as they are today." Elon found that the people of Carmiel (the majority of whom are highly skilled immigrants from Western Europe and the U.S.) share in the explicit characterization that the Arabs in Galilee are "cancer" in the body of the state. He affirmed, further, what every Arab villager in the area knew, that Carmiel "has never become a 'center for services' for the surrounding Arab villages, as it was promised in the beginning, except for its police station!" Furthermore, it was obvious for Elon that Carmiel was created "for Jews only," and that for the villagers (Arabs), it is "the center of unofficial 'apartheid' in the region."

With the formal dissolution of the military government in Galilee at the end of 1966, and with the occupation of new and densely-populated Palestinian areas in 1967, the settlement thrust was redirected to the West Bank. Fearing laxity in the push to Judaize the Galilee, a new and more vigorous strategy to expropriate additional Arab lands in Galilee was developed. The strategy for the "Judaization of Galilee" was explained in an October 1975 Ministry of Agriculture publication:

. . . the special problem of the Galilee region is that the Jewish population is out-numbered by the non-Jewish [sic] population . . .

It is necessary to change the existing situation regarding the demographic ratio between the Jewish population and the non-Jewish, by means of implementing a long-term development program . . .

. . . Since the fundamental task of the proposal—making Galilee into a region with a Jewish majority—cannot apparently be implemented in the immediate future, the plan was devised to comprise of an early part extending to 1980 and a later stage from 1980 to 1990.

(as quoted in *MERIP* #47, p. 4)

What of the demographic ratios between Arabs and Jews in Galilee? As indicated earlier, the military occupation of the region in 1948 succeeded in effecting a major blow to the Arab concentration in the entire Northern District. Table 2 describes the demographic distribution in the district since 1948.

After constituting 84 percent of the total population of the district by the end of 1946, the Arab ratio of the population in the Northern District dropped to 63 percent in 1948. The military government, armed by a series of lethal laws designed to expropriate Arab lands, succeeded in reducing the Arab concentration in the district, during the first 13 years, by 20 percent, while simultaneously increasing the ratio of the Jewish concentration. By 1972, and with the immediate priorities shifting to the newly-occupied areas, the Arab percentage started to increase again.

The figures in Table 2, however, obscure the direction of the Judaization thrust in the district, and the success of the military government in the total decimation of the Arab population in some sub-districts. The following table (Table 3) illustrates clearly the targets of the renewed Judaization thrust in the Northern District. Only two regions in Galilee still contain a predominant Arab majority: "Western Lower Galilee"—87.6 percent, and "Nazareth–Tir'an Mountains"—74.3 percent. The rest have been effectively "transformed," or Judaized. Indeed, the immediate targets in the 1975–76 expropriations were in Western Galilee

Table 2

Population in Northern District, by population group and year*

Population group	Year				
	1948	**1961**	**1972**	**1979**	**1980**
Total Jews in country ('000)	716.7	1,932.3	2,686.7	3,218.4	3,282.7
Total Jews in district ('000)	53.4	194.3	255.7	307.2	326.9
% of Jews in district	7.5	10.0	9.5	9.5	9.7
Total Arabs in country ('000)	156.0	247.2	461.0	617.8	639.0
Total Arabs in district ('000)	90.6	142.8	217.6	286.9	296.1
% of Arabs in district	58.1	57.7	47.2	46.4	46.3
Total population in district ('000)	144.0	337.1	473.3	594.1	613.0
% Jews	37.1	57.6	54.0	51.7	51.7
% Arabs	62.9	42.4	46.0	48.3	48.3

*adapted from *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1981*: 32–33, Tables II/3, 4.

Table 3

Population in Northern District, by population group and Sub-District (31 December 1980)*

Northern District	Arabs			Jews	
	Pop. ('000)	Bedouin Tribes	Local-ities	Pop. ('000)	Local-ities
Safad Sub-District	5.0	—	3	60.2	58
Hula Basin	0.0	—	—	26.5	23
Eastern Upper Galilee	2.9	—	2	.24.0	27
Hazor Region	2.1	—	1	9.7	8
Kenneret Sub-District	14.4	1	3	46.5	42
Kinerot	1.5	1	—	40.1	25
Eastern Lower Galilee	12.9	—	3	6.4	17
Yizreel Sub-District	111.7	10	25	113.8	92
Beisan Basin	0.0	—	—	21.6	20
Harod Valley	0.8	—	1	5.8	9
Kokhav Plateau	3.8	—	5	2.0	4
Yizreel Basin	2.9	—	3	44.5	42
Menashe Plateau	0.0	—	—	3.9	7
Nazareth-Tir'an Mts.	104.2	10	16	36.0	10
Akka Sub-District	165.0	3	39	96.4	70
Western Lower Galilee	103.1	3	17	14.5	14
Yehiam Region	28.1	—	12	7.1	18
Elon Region	4.9	—	3	4.5	14
Nahariyya Region	12.7	—	4	37.2	16
Akka Region	16.3	—	3	33.0	8

Statistical Abstract of Israel 1981: 36, Table II/7

and the Nazareth region. The Arab population protested these expropriations in a massive general strike on 30 March 1976. Six Arabs were fatally shot by Israeli Border Guard units.

Strongly affected by this course of events, the District Commissioner of the Northern District, the highest ranking official of the Ministry of the Interior whose headquarters is in Upper Nazareth (Jewish Nazareth), recommended in a secret memorandum to the Prime Minister the following:

> Expand and deepen Jewish settlements in areas where the contiguity of the Arab population is prominent, and where they number considerably more than the Jewish population; examine the possibility of diluting existing Arab population concentrations.
>
> (Koenig 1976: 193)

In the meantime, the military government in the West Bank was moving rapidly to facilitate the Judaization of the area. It would be intolerable to Zionist planners to allow for another Galilee—more populated, larger and more intact—within Israel's jurisdiction. Thus, Arab lands in the West Bank became the new and explicit target of expropriation in the hope of Judaizing the entire region. As it was in Galilee so it is in the West Bank: the actual goal is not the mere creation of Jewish settlements, although this is important.

> The intent behind implanting Jewish settlements in the West Bank (outside Jerusalem) is . . . to take the *land*, while crowding, isolating, and eventually forcing out its people, whom it never sought to add to the state.
>
> (Janet Abu-Lughod 1981: 38)

The latest in a series of "master plans" towards achieving this goal, and which has covertly tied the process of settlement between the West Bank and Galilee, is the plan proposed by Matityahu Drobles for "the development of settlement in Judea and Samaria, 1979–1983," under the auspices of the World Zionist Organization. Among the principles that guided the plan are:

> settlement throughout the entire Land of Israel is for security and by right. A strip of settlements at strategic sites enhances both internal and external security alike, *as well as making concrete and realizing our right to Eretz-Israel.*
>
> (emphasis added)

• • •

> The disposition of the settlements must be carried out not only *around* the settlements of the minorities, but also *in between them*, this in accordance with the settlement policy adopted in Galilee and in other parts of the country.
>
> (World Zionist Organization 1978: 1; emphasis in original)

It is clear, therefore, that what might be called the checkered pattern of settlement—Nazareth vs. Natzeret Ilit, Tarshiha vs. Ma'alot, Western Galilee vs. Carmiel—that has been followed since the fifties in Israel, has been applied in the West Bank since 1967. Not to mention, of course, the parallels in the legal and economic measures that have been enforced to expropriate the lands in the first place.

The singularity in the Zionist design for both regions leads to a situation of "beneficial borrowing:" what was tried successfully in Galilee is applied anew in the West Bank, and vice-versa. The plan for erecting "lookouts" (*mitzpim*) which was tried first in the West Bank has been used in Galilee for the last three years. This allows the state, through its military apparatus, to declare an entire area, that has been already confiscated, and that overlooks an Arab concentration, as a desirable spot for a "lookout." This means that without the need for a large number of settlers (which is beneficial in a state of dwindling "pioneers"!), a certain area can be claimed and held by the state. In 1979–1980, Galilee was targeted for 29 such "lookouts." The rationale for that was the same as the rationale for the "Judaization of Galilee." A recent Jewish Agency document was titled "The Establishment of Lookouts in the Mountainous Galilee: The Struggle to Protect the Nation's Land and Ensure the Character of the Area for the Future." The title provides ample explanation. The situation, as described in this memorandum, is so severe that it "poses a major threat to the character of the area as part of the Jewish state, to Jewish control thereof, and even to Israeli sovereignty over it." (Halabi 1981: 225).

What seems to be happening is this: a new dialectic relationship has been created between the two Galilees through military occupation. Ruthless military government leads to successful expropriation and Judaization of one area (Galilee), which, through a new military occupation of another area (West Bank), leads to a new round of expropriations and Judaization. But as we have seen the thrust of Judaizing the West Bank has been blamed for the "neglect" and laxity in the total Judaization of Galilee. This, in turn, refocuses the intensity on Galilee. Thus, Amos Elon, in his series on Galilee, claims that Carmiel "was a victim of this neglect." To support his claim, he compared the population figures of the settlement between those projected in the development plan and the actual figures. Whereas the actual population of Carmiel in 1979 (when the series was written) was 13,000, the projected figure was to have been 20,000. Likewise, the difference in 1970 between the actual and the projected figure was about 9,000 (*Ha'aretz*, 30 November–7 December 1979).

Of course, it is highly unlikely that the thrust of West Bank settlement was the cause of this "deficit," since other factors were at work here. But what is clear, however, is the fact that these claims and pressures led to a new intensification of the Judaization process in Galilee. Had they had the potential settlers, they would not have needed the new plan for "lookouts."

In the light of what preceded, the process of Jewish settlements in the "occupied areas" (the West Bank and Gaza) should not and cannot be viewed as a unique and different stage in the occupation of Palestine. Neither should it be viewed as a mere extension of what happened in Galilee. Controlling and Judaizing the Galilee and the West Bank have been informed consistently by the same theory that continues to guide Zionist action: No portion of Palestine can have an Arab majority; Arab Palestinian concentrations have to be fragmented and sliced up; the ownership relationship between the Palestinian and the land ought to be broken; and finally, the land itself, regardless of the population, must come under direct Jewish control. For their goals, Zionist planners could never afford to make the distinction between Galilee and the West Bank; and for our goal towards a successful liberation, neither can we.

NOTES

1. Janet Abu-Lughod's paper was subsequently published in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Vol. XI, No. 2, pp. 16–54), and in *Palestinian Rights: Affirmation and Denial*, I. Abu-Lughod, ed., Wilmette, Illinois: Medina Press, 1982, pp. 107–141.
2. Limiting the comparison of occupation only to two major parts of Palestine, namely, Galilee and the West Bank, is not to deny, of course, that other parts of Palestine were also occupied, whether in 1948 or 1967. The purpose of the comparison is to delineate and expose the continuity of Zionist practice in all of Palestine.

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APPENDIX I

A Third Galilee?

As the following article indicates, the Israeli military occupation of Southern Lebanon is already exhibiting some parallels with the occupation of the West Bank/Gaza and the Galilee. Indeed, in an article in *The Times* (London) of July 29, 1982, Israeli Cabinet minister Yuval Ne'eman (who belongs to the extreme right-wing Tehiya Party) "described occupied Lebanon up to the port city of Sidon as part of Eretz Israel—the Biblical land of Israel—and advocated that Israel's army should now remain there for an extended period of 'years rather than months.' "

Boston Globe, August 17, 1982

Occupation in Lebanon

Israeli administration parallels West Bank's

By William Claiborne
Washington Post

SIDON, Lebanon—Ringed with armored personnel carriers and emblazoned with blue-and-white Israeli flags, the Lebanese government regional office here hums with the noises of a busy bureaucracy transplanted from Israel.

The Israeli army calls the regional occupation office "headquarters for aid to the civil population of Lebanon." But the operation eerily resembles the occupation headquarters in Beit El, near the West Bank town of Ramallah.

Israeli critics of the war, voicing skepticism of Prime Minister Menachem Begin's promise to withdraw his army once Palestinian guerrillas and the Syrian army leave, have begun to refer to southern Lebanon as the "North Bank."

At the office here, anxious-looking Lebanese, seeking permits for everything from travel to the next town to building a new house, sit on wooden benches. A bored Israeli private absently shuffles papers and waves officers into the inner sanctum.

There, Col. Shaul Nurel, head of the assistance section of the Israeli Civil Administration of southern Lebanon, reads the orders and memos that clutter his desk, and answers his two telephones, alternately speaking in Hebrew and Arabic.

Across town, Khalim Fayad, regional governor of the Lebanese central government, sits in a borrowed office at the University of Lebanon. His desk is bare, except for two uniformed guards, the waiting room outside is empty.

Fayad was displaced when the Israeli army moved into the regional government building, and with a mixture of grudging admiration and vague worry, he has watched the Israelis assemble a vast and complex occupation administration that has signs of being around for a while.

What gnaws at the back of Fayad's mind is that the Israelis have done it with the kind of efficiency that comes with practice, and that time may erode their declared intention to allow self-rule for Lebanon.

"We know that in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip they have done many things. They have dismissed mayors and removed municipal counsels. But we are against any such developments here. We stand firmly . . . this country is sovereign, and we want this occupation to come to an end so that the Lebanese can take care of themselves," Fayad said.

To a visitor who observed the Israeli occupation apparatus in the West Bank, the similarities in Lebanon are striking.

Many of the faces are familiar, including that of Nurel, who for 14 years worked in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula. Organizational charts on the walls here are almost identical to those in the West Bank headquarters, with departments for health, welfare, industry and trade, agriculture, transportation and other functions of civil administrations.

Most of the army officers and civilian employees here were either drawn from the West Bank occupation headquarters or have had experience there, Nurel said, and many procedures here were simply moved from Beit El.

Nurel says there are also fundamental differences. "The structure differs in that in the West Bank, the civil administration is engaged in actually doing things. It builds schools and hospitals on its own, and initiates other projects on its own. Here, we are simply assisting the local inhabitants. They are putting their lives in order, and all we are doing is making it easier for them," Nurel said.

He added, "I consider the population here, compared to Judea and Samaria [the Biblical names for the West Bank], to be basically friendly. We do not have the same kind of relationship."

On some aspects of the occupation, Nurel and Fayad are in basic agreement. Fayad, for example, concedes that most of the rebuilding of war-shattered southern Lebanon is being left to the Lebanese with a minimum of Israeli interference.

"There is no doubt that they have a lot of experience in the occupation business, but they admitted themselves that they were surprised to see in Sidon that the Lebanese could, in a very short time, clean up the debris and restore the essential services. We did it ourselves, and we did it very efficiently," Fayad said. He estimated that in the Sidon region alone, the Israeli invasion caused about $200 million in damage, including crops lost because of neglect.

The governor said the resiliency, ingrained after nearly a decade of violence, would sustain the Lebanese through the rebuilding period—although he added that the Israeli efforts to help were appreciated.

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